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Chapter 4

Prospects for black representation
·
after Miller v Johnson
Keith Reeves

"Sadly ... one wonders whether the majority [of the Supreme Court
justices} still believes that ... race discrimination against nonwhites is
a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was."

J.:.

-Justice Harry Blackmun 1

he 1990s undoubtedly will go down in.the history b.ooks _as.Jue ,
~)ec~d~ in ~hidi the poiitical pendulum veered toward a prevailing
_disdain_for race.-conscious public policies. Perhaps nowhere has the
swing of this pendulum been more controversial and disconcerting than
in the arena of legislative districting. Io .the years.since_the pc1,ssage._Qf_tb,e
1?82_amendments to the Voting Rights Act, we have witnessed an.avalanche
of polarizing litigation around the explosive subject.of voting_districts_tJ:iat 1
/
have _been intentionally configured by ,race.
···· Following the directive of the 1982 amendments-~}:i!ch_i:g;i._ndare.ci
racial-· reapportionment
to take place afte.r .the J.99.0.Census-it
.
.
.
. ,
.
. ·-was the
'
view of U.S._Ju.st:ice_Department .officials that where_ra.cial_b,l~c-V:Q!.WE
~;,hites is present, the c~eation.of majority-bla,ck_electi,-on_cii.s.tri.~ts
p~~v~nt~ the dilution of blacks' voting strength and at the same time facilitates greater black representation. 2. By. ca~ing ~ut j~is,dicti;;;~i~-~hi~h
tii,acks. comprise a majority of voters,.. then_the___districts_it:1-the_main_ip.-_
creased the HkeH}:iood that a black candidate. woukLbe..elected. 3,.
~~ "'But the policy met with vehement resistance and out-and-out
condemnation among conservatives in academic, judicial, political, and
policy circles. Critics argued that the Voting Rights Act was being shaped
"into an instrument for affirmative action in the electoral sphere." 4
~

"

'

-

Configuring voting districts to increase the likelihood that blacks might be
elected to Congress "raises the specter of racial quotas, deepening racial
and ethnic cleavages, and minority political ghettos." 5
On the contracy, retorted voting rights advocates. The 1982 amendments
to the Voting Rights Act have not fully addressed the lack of equal political
opportunity for blacks. For instance, the fact that blacks remain significantly
underrepresented in elected office-especially at the federal level-is a
troubling, if not shameful imperfection in the democratic functioning of
this countcy. Equally problematic is that bloc voting among whites on
account of racial animus still remains a considerable barrier for black political
candidates competing in majority-white electoral settings. 6 Until recently,
these facts constituted a compelling justification for racial districting to
offset voting discrimination against black office-seekers. 7
This was the case until the 1995 Su reme Court ruling that invalidated
the use of race as "the redominant facto " ·
·
ative boundary
.!!!£§,_ Writing for a conservative plurality of the Court, Justice Anthony
Kennedy reasoned: Q_ust as the state may not, absent extraordinary
justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks,
buses, golf courses, beaches, and schools, the Government also may not
separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.~So
with the swipe of a judicial pen, Rep. Cynthia McKinney of Georgia-the
state's first black congresswoman-saw her district change from two-thirds
majority-black to two-thirds majority-white. lO McKinney and other black
lawmakers were acutely aware of the dire implications of the new political
reality. Indeed, a year later, Steven Holmes of 1be New York Times expressed
that reality in a sentence shortly after the Court rendered decisions
concerning majority-black districts in North Carolina and Texas: "The countcy
will· soon have to face a practical question that all those legislative
contortions were intended to avoid: Will whites vote for black candidates?" 11
To say that this is a practical and empirical question of great dispute
is an understatement. Taking that question's full measure requires
canvassing the controversial terrain of white bloc voting as an obstacle to
black electoral success.
MEASURING PROGRESS IN BLACK OFFICEHOLDING

That there has been some incremental change in the election of blacks to
public office cannot be disputed. The Voting Rights Act brought an immediate and extraordinacy change in the nation's political landscape. Besides
bringing hundreds of thousands of blacks into the political process, fed,
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eral voting rights legislation facilitated the election of blacks to public
office. In 1941, the total number of black officeholders nationwide was a
mere 33, compared to 280 in 1965. Fewer than 100 blacks held office in
the seven originally targeted Southern states at the time the legislation was
enacted. 12 The magnitude of the growth in black officeholding is shown
in Figure 4.1. Over a two-decade span, the number of blacks elected to
public office rose over 500 percent from 1,469 in 1970 to 7,370 in 1990.
Today, more than 8,000 blacks hold elected office at the federal, state,
city, county, and municipal levels of government.
'
The impact of the Voting Rights Act on black electoral success in the
South was dramatic (Table 4.1). Indeed, Southern states contributed much
to the numerical increase in black officeholding-4,544. With a net increase
of 172 blacks, the state of Texas led the region, followed by Louisiana
(57), South Carolina (37), Mississippi (35); and Georgia (32). Of the ten
states with the largest number of black elected officials, eight are in the
South: Mississippi (751), Alabama (699), Louisiana (636), Georgia (545),
Texas ( 472), North Carolina ( 468), South Carolina (450), and Arkansas
(380). 13 And yet the sizable increase in black officeholding in the South
has not changed the status quo; on the whole, "the region's officeholders
remain members of the majority racial group." 14
In Arkansas, for example, blacks account for 11. 4 percent of the votingage population but comprise a mere 3.8 percent of all elected officials in
the state. Similarly, a scant 2.5 percent of all elected officials in Tennessee
are black. In Texas the percentage is 1.8, and in Virginia, 5.0 percent.
Bernard Grofman and 'Lisa Handley, grappling with the underrepresentation of black officeholders, have argued that "politics in the United
States, especially in the South, is characterized by a high level of racially
polarized voting. As a consequence, only areas with very substantial black
population percentages are likely to elect blacks." 15 By no means is this
an exaggeration. The number of blacks elected to Congress, for instance,
increased from 26 to 39 in 1992 and to 41 in 1994. However, as is readily
apparent from Table 4.2, were it not for predominantly black electoral
districts,fewerblacks would have been: sent to Congress. This is especially
true in the South. Prior to the 1990 reapportionment, there were a total of
four black congresspersons from the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
Following congressional reapportionment in 1991, blacks were elected
from Florida for the first time ever and from Alabama, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Virginia for the first time in more than a century. All
were sent to Congress from majority-black districts. Chandler Davidson
After
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The growth in total black elected officials in the
United States, 1970-93

1970~
1971

1,860

1972

I
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l

2,621

1974

2,991

1975

3,503

1976

;3,979

1977

4,311

1978

4,503

1979

4,607

1980
1981

5,038

1982

5,160

1983

5,606

1984

5,700

1985

6 056

1986

6,424

1987

6,681

1988
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6,829
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1990
1991

7,226
7,370
7,480

1992
1993
Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies.
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8,015

puts the point more exactly: " ... blacks ... have had an extremely difficult
time electing their candidates to office as a result of white bloc voting and
dilutionary election laws .... " 16
The remarkable upswing in black officeholding just discussed, then,
must be attributed primarily to direct federal intervention-in the form of
the Voting Rights Act-rather than to changing regional or nationatracial
attitudes. Laughlin McDonald, summing up the prevailing view of votingrights experts, explains: "The increase in minority officeholding can be
traced to the operation of the Voting Rights Act as a whole-to the abolition
of discriminatory tests for voting, the expansion of minority registration,
and the requirement of preclearance of new voting practices under
Section 5. Equally critical, however, has been the adoption of effective
minority voting districts, many as a result of litigation or the threat of
litigation under Section 2." 17
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG WHITES

Admittedly, a number of black officeholders have won elections in the last
two decades with substantial support from white voters, sometimes even
in majority-white jurisdictions. For instance, Tom Bradley of Los Angeles,
Ernest Moria! of New Orleans, Harold Washington of Chicago, David Dinkins
of New York, Norman Rice of Seattle, and Ron Kirk of Dallas were the first
blacks ever to govern these metropolitan cities. 18 Bradley was first elected
in 1973 and served until June 1993. Moria! won the New Orleans mayoralty in 1977 with 19 percent of the white vote. Garnering no more than
12 percent of the vote share among white Chicagoans, Washington still
won the 1983 election; he was re-elected in 1987 but died a few weeks
after being sworn in. In a city where Democrats outnumber Republicans 5
to 1, Dinkins won the New York mayoralty by just two percentage points,
capturing just 31 percent of the white vote in 1989. Elected as Dallas' first
black mayor in 1995, Kirk gained a much larger portion of the white vote,
42 percent.
It should be emphasized that it is very difficult for black candidates to
be elected outside majority-black jurisdictions despite these well-publicized
cases. In 1989, Virginian Douglas Wilder became the first black elected
governor from a southern state. Exit polls showed that he captured 39
percent of the white vote. In 1992, Carol Moseley-Braun of Illinois became
the first black woman ever to hold a seat in the United States Senate. 19 In ·
1996, Julia Carson was elected to Congress from a white-majority district
in Indiana, along with three black lawmakers who were forced to run in
redrawn majority-white jurisdictions. zo
After HIiier v Johnson~

Citing such well-publicized election breakthroughs, critics of raceconscious districting have argued that the phenomenon of racial bloc voting
among whites on account of racial animus has largely collapsed. For that
reason, it is no longer necessary to draw legislative boundaries to enhance
the election prospects of black office-seekers. Carol Swain, for instance,
maintains: "Black Democrats Ronald Dellums, Alan Wheat, and Bill Clay
and black Republicans Gary Franks and J.C. Watts have shown that white
voters in congressional elections will support black candidates. Similarly,
the elections of Illinois Senator Carol Moseley Braun, former Virginia
Governor L. Douglas Wilder, Ohio Treasurer J. Kenneth Blackwell, and
New York Comptroller Carl McCall show that race is no longer an
insurmountable barrier to black electoral success at the state level as well." 21
Richard Pildes reaches a sharply contrasting conclusion. He has argued, for example, that despite such political gains on the part of black
Americans, whites remain less willing because of race to support black
candidates for elected office, and any assertion that they are so inclined is
"fanciful." 22 He admonishes that "general inferences drawn from a few
easily recalled examples are notoriously hazardous guides to truth." 23 In
other words, the anecdotal evidence of a few case studies is wholly inadequate to buttress the generalized conclusions being drawn. But, in fact,
the literature contains example after example of black office-seekers who
were unable to attract sizable electoral support from white voters due to
consistent and widespread bloc voting patterns. For instance, Paul Kleppner
concluded that race dominated voting choices in the 1983 Chicago mayoral election between Harold Washington and Bernard Epton. 24 Meanwhile, a 1989 American Civil Liberties Union study of elections in Georgia
found that where there was a "serious" black political candidate, 86 percent of whites voted for the white opponent(s) of the black office-seeker. 25
In a more recent investigation, Michael Binford marshaled evidence demonstrating that very few white Georgians crossed-over to-cast a ballot for
a black political candidate and that levels of bloc voting among whites
were more pronounced in higher-profile contests. 26
This, of course, raises the question: "Why do whites tend to vote
along racial lines?" Richard Murray and Arnold Vedlitz along with Carol
Swain, for instance, have suggested that voters support an office-seeker
with whom they share skin color or ethnicity 27 and that this is expectedif not rational-behavior. But I would also suggest that where the vote
choice involves a black candidate, white voters do not simply react positively to the white candidate but negatively to the black one because
whites still harbor antiblack opinions, attitudes, and characterizations. To
, . Redistricting and nllnortty representation

put the point more exactly, despite the positive and genuine changes in
whites' racial attitudes during the past several decades, old-fashioned bigotry and prejudice are not entirely dead. 28 Racial stereotyping among
whites is as prevalent today as old-fashioned bigotry and prejudice ever
was, according to recent research. 29 In one such study, respondents were
given a card showing a seven-point scale with a positive characteristic,
such as "intelligent," at one end and the opposite characteristic, such as
"unintelligent," at the other. In addition, study participants were asked to
rank their own race and the other race on the following criteria:
•

Rich versus poor;

•

Prefers to be self-supporting versus prefers to live off welfare;

•

Hard to get along with versus easy to get along with;

•

Tends to speak English well versus tends to speak English poorly. 30

Figure 4.2 presents the scores white study respondents assigged to
both whites and blacks as categorical groups. 31 Although some whites
coi:islsteiitly ranked blacks at the same point on the four scales highlighted
in Figure 4.2, what is clear is that whites generally believe blacks are less
intelligent than whites, prefer more than whites to live off welfare, are
more difficult to get along with, and speak English much more poorly
than whites. Indeed, whites saw the largest gaps with regard to a preference
for self-support and the ability to speak English, while they viewed the
racial discrepancy as small with regard to getting along with blacks. Fiftysix percent of· white respondents ranked whites ahead of blacks in
intelligence, 71 percent ranked whites higher with regard to self-support
while more than three-quarters reported that whites spoke English better
than blacks. The central point to be made here then is this: whites tend to
view blacks as inferior to their own group along several dimensions, and
they are apf to evaluate black political candidates as such. 3 2
Moreover, the tendency toward white bloc voting is further exacerbated
by the use of racial campaign appeals by their white opponents. For
example, in 1986 and again in 1988, Louisiana attorney Faye Williams
attempted to become the first black candidate to win elected office from
the eighth congressional district and the first black to represent the state in
the U.S. Congress since Reconstruction. Williams, an Alexandria attorney,
found herself in a hotly contested runoff with Republican Clyde Holloway,
a white nurseryman and self-proclaimed "good old boy" who had led a
1981 school busing protest. Contributing to her narrow defeat in 1986, 33
undoubtedly, was a racially charged campaign permeated with both blatant
After HIiier v Jolrnson ~
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How Detroit area whites rated blacks and whites with
regard to four components of stereotype index, on a
scale from I to 7
INTELLIGENT

SELF-SUPPORTING

Mean= 4.9 I Mean= 4.0

■
II

Blacks

Whites

2%

~ ?%

....

5%~23%

_ _ _ ___.36%

29%

1%~ .25%
I

0

0

UNINTELLIGENT

PREFERS TO LIVE OFF WELFARE

EASYTO GET ALONG WITH

SPEAKS ENGLISH WELL

40%

0

()

HARD TO GET ALONG WITH

SPEAKS ENGLISH POORLY

Source: Reynolds Farley, Maria Krysan,Tara Jackson, Charlotte Steeh, and Keith Reeves, "Causes of
Continued Racial Residential Segregation: Stereotypes, Steering, and Residential Preferences," American Journal of Sociology 100, 1994.
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and subtle appeals to racism, conveyed by both her opponent and the
news media. 34 Indeed, despite the election of some black candidates from
majority-white districts, for most minority candidates strong voting along
racial lines remains the reality. 35
PROVING RACIAL ANIMUS TOWARD BLACK OFFICE-SEEKERS

Where it is found that blacks and whites vote differently, disputants of
race-conscious districting understandably remain skeptical that racial bloc
voting on the part of whites "keeps candidates preferred by blacks from
gaining office." Besides, many are confounded by the thorny concept of
"racially polarized voting"-how to measure it, how it works, and, perhaps
most important, how to define it. Abigail Thernstrom, for instance, opines:
"The question of racial polarization is central to any voting rights dispute,
but there is no consensus on how to measure it. ... Black candidates, like
white ones, lose elections for a variety of reasons, including insufficient
support from black constituents, the power. of incumbency, inadequate
name recognition, age, experience, reputation, and political orientation ....
Disputes over the extent of racial bloc voting and the record of minority
electoral successes disguise the real question: how much weight should
one give to the fact that whites tend to vote for whites, blacks for
blacks ... ?" 36
Moreover, the secrecy of the ballot precludes us--much of the timefrom disentangling the myriad of factors that influence a voter's candidate
selection. Indeed, attempting to discern whether whites' political choices
in a biracial political contest are motivated by racial animus is daunting. 37
Bernard Grofman has commented:
It is as a matter of practical statistical analysis, essentially impossible

to ... [distinguish ifl the voting patterns of whites ... [are] caused by
the race of the voter or by partisanship, because partisanship and
race are so inextricably intertwined. In order to do the statistical
analysis ... you have to shift from bivariate to multivariate ... the
problem with that is twofold. First of all, it's almost impossible to
figure out what you've got when you've got it. It sort of messes
everything up. It's just very, very complicated. And secondly, what
will happen is these other things are more or less highly correlated
with race. If for example, whites are more likely to get newspaper
endorsements in small southern towns than black challengers ... then
what's going to happen is that all these other explanatory factors are
going to suggest that voting isn't polarized, even explanatorily
polarized. What will happen is that the race of the voters will wash
out. All these other things which turn out to be more or less
After MIiier v Johnson
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synonymous with or correlated with the race of the candidate will
sort of explain away the patterns of voting.'' 38
Indeed Grofman and his colleagues, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi,
have gone so far as to argue that proving discriminatory intent by whites
is impossible. 39
To be sure, demonstrating that whites engage in white bloc voting on
account of racial animus has been a herculean task to date. For voters, any
electoral choice is a concealed, perhaps even camouflaged activity. This is
especially the case for whites when the choice includes a black candidate.
One can enter the voting booth, make a selection, exit, and be greeted by
a pollster inquiring about one's vote. To this inquiry, one can answer
truthfully or otherwise. Given the privacy of the ballot, the political analyst
is relegated to drawing inferences about individual judgments and political
choices from aggregate voting returns--usually cross-registration and
turnout figures. Using data of this sort to assess whether whites' political
choices are affected by racial animus or anything else is beset with specific
limitations, the most serious being that cross-registration and turnout data
do not provide direct information about what motivates the selection of a
candidate. Thus, it is difficult to discern the reasons for whites' political
choices in a biracial contest. In fact, however, identifying and demonstrating
racial animus among whites can be shown by the use of carefully controlled
experimental methods. 40
To ascertain whether whites' political choices are motivated by racial
animus, I conducted a biracial campaign study experiment. First, a representative cross-section of white individuals residing in Michigan were interviewed as part of a probability, face-to-face public opinion survey. This
initial study specifically sought to examine the links among racial attitudes, racial residential segregation, and labor market inequalities. Individuals were queried about their identification with political parties and
ideological predispositions. Standard demographic information, such as
education, income, gender, and religious orientation, was collected as
well. Given the primary focus of the study, only household members 21
years of age and older were eligible.
Approximately six months later, each of the white respondents
interviewed in the face-to-face opinion survey was randomly assigned to
receive a brief mail questionnaire containing one of two contrived news
campaign stories. Each campaign story depicted an especially negativespirited, nonpartisan mayoral election contest between two fictitious
candidates: Arthur Christopher, a well-respected businessman and former

+

Redlstl'tctlng and minority representation

head of the city's chamber of commerce, and Gregoi:y Hammond, a fifteenyear veteran of the city council. The text of these "news articles" appears
in Figure 4.3.
The reader will observe that it refers to the fact that Christopher and
Hammond hold contrasting policy stances regarding affirmative action
policy; candidate Hammond is depicted as a prudent proponent of
affirmative action. However, the text of the second news article is nearly
identical, save for one important detail: candidate Hammond's race was
changed. This particular campaign stoi:y reported that he is "seeking to
become the city's first black mayor." Thus, in the two news campaign
articles that described the mayoral candidates' stances on affirmative action
policy, one stoi:y depicted a same-race contest in which both mayoral
candidates are white, while the other news stoi:y described a biracial contest,
in which one office-seeker is white and his opponent black.

H@Hiii
Text of campaign news stories used in experimental study
(italicized text was changed in second version of story)
CANDIDATES DISAGREE ON AFARMATIVEACTION
by Thomas Young
Staff Writer
The nonpartisan mayoral race entered its final hours with the candidates, local
businessman Arthur Christopher and long-time city councilman Gregory Hammond
answering voters' questions during a well-attended town meeting last night.
What began as a clash of visions and personalities, by evening's end, the candidates' exchanges took on a more amiable tone as members of the audience pleaded with
them to focus on issues and dispense with the negative attacks that marked the
campaign thus far.
Though a wide array of questions from education to the environment was posed
to the candidates, a question regarding affirmative action elicited the sharpest disagreement between Christopher and Hammond during the evening.
David Carnes, an unemployed laborer, asked the candidates to explain their
positions on affirmative action. Christopher, 47, who is white, said that he opposes
affirmative action programs. "Quotas are not the answer. My opponent's support of
affirmative action programs amounts to quotas, plain and simple." Hammond, 45, who is
also white, retorted that Christopher continues to misrepresent his position. "I favor
affirmative action programs as a remedy when there has been an identifiable history of
discrimination by an employer:' Hammond said.
Both Christopher and Hammond noted that they are well-suited to tackle the
city's growing deficit. Christopher cited his long-time business experience and five-year
involvement with the city's Chamber of Commerce which has helped bring jobs to the
area. Hammond, on the other hand, said that his fifteen years on the council makes him
the most qualified to address the city's increasingly complex problems.
After HIiier V
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Finally, each of the print news campaign articles concluded by
mentioning identical biographical information about the candidates' age,
professional qualifications, and experience. Thus, the campaign stories
given to white participants in the study differed only in one dimension:
the mention ofthe candidates· race. As one can readily see, all other central
campaign information did not vary. 41
A research investigation of this kind is particularly significant for the
following reasons. First, the study provides direct information about the
motivations and sentiments underlying white voting behavior toward a
black office-seeker. For instance, respondents were queried about their:
(1) racial attitudes, (2) evaluation of the candidates, and (3) vote choices"if the election were held today." Second, the fact that many voting-rights
disputes cover small jurisdictions or past events means that individuallevel survey instruments for these cases are usually not available and cannot
be constructed. 42 This experimental campaign study enables us to peer
inside the privacy of the ballot box. Third and most important, if it can be
shown that whites' limited receptivity toward a black office-seeker is due
to racial animus-independent of political orientation, qualifications, and
experience, age, reputation, or some other personal attribute-is an
affirmative remedy not warranted? Finally, because great care was taken to
anticipate and avoid the weaknesses generally associated with experiments,
the results can be generalized to the populations of interest here. 43
Several striking conclusions emerge from this biracial election campaign study. First, whites who read the affirmative action-biracial contest
news story were reluctant to vote for the black Hammond candidate, despite the fact that he possessed identical credentials, political experience,
and personal characteri5tics as his white counterpart depicted in the other
news story. Second, whites' aversion to casting a ballot for the black office-seeker is associated with the negative attitudes, opinions, stereotypes,
and characterizations they harbor about blacks as a categorical group. The
Hammond candidate was evaluated accordingly. Third, and perhaps most
important, racial animus-and not ideological orientation-was the significant determinant of white electoral support toward the black mayoral
candidate in the study. Indeed, the voting discrimination against the black
political candidate was found to be "discernible, specific, purposeful, contempornry." Given the arresting empirical evidence-from which more
reliable inferences about whites' voting behavior can be drawn--one must
conclude that with few exceptions then, "barriers to the election of minority candidates from predominantly white jurisdictions have not collapsed." 44

t
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CONCLUSION

With all the enormous inroads made by black office-seekers since the
passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act-and it5 subsequent amendments-racial bloc voting among whites is still a constant and pernicious barrier
for many who must garner white electoral support. It stacks the electoral
deck against black political candidates. What is more, white bloc voting
on account of racial animus shows no signs of diminishing. Chandler
Davidson has argued that "there is still a great deal of resistance to the
election of black officials by whites in the country as a whole." 45 All signs
of the post-Miller political reality point to an almost certain standstill, or
worse-a diminution of the number of black officeholders at the
congressional, state, and local levels. 46 Yet, in the face of strong evidence
that continued and widespread white bloc voting based on racial animus
in the main "keeps candidates preferred by blacks from gaining office,"
the Court has made redressing this injustice much more difficult with its
recent foray into the "jurispmdential wilderness" of racial redistricting.

After HIiier y Jollnson
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I am indebted to David A. Bositis, Tara D. Jackson, Robert Richie, and
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work. Moreover,
I extend my appreciation to Mary Jane Rose for her assistance in preparing the
tables and figures.
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Black elected officials in southern states as a percentage of
all elected officials, January 1993

STATE

BLACKS ASA
PERCENTAGE OF
VOTING-AGE
POPULATION

ELECTED OFFICIALS
TOTAL

BLACK

PERCENT
BLACK

NET CHANGE
(1992-93)

Alabama

22.7

4,315

699

16.2

-3

Arkansas

13.7

8,331

380

4.6

38

Florida

11.4

5,256

200

3.8

17

Georgia

24.6

6,556

545

18.3

32

Louisiana

27.9

4,966

636

12.8

57

Mississippi

31.6

4,944

751

15.2

35

North Carolina

20.1

5,531

468

8.5

10

South Carolina

26.9

3,692

450

12.:Jt.

37

Tennessee

14.4

6,841

168

2.5

Texas

11.2

26,932

472

1.8

172

Virginia

17.6

3,112

155

5.0

-I

Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies.
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Congressional districts in which blacks constituted a
majority of the population, I 04th Congress
STATE

Alabama
Florida
Florida
Florida
Georgia
Georgia
Georgia
Illinois
Illinois
Illinois
Louisiana
Louisiana
Maryland
Maryland
Michigan
Michigan
Mississippi

DISTRICT
NUM5ER

PERCENT
5LACK

PERCENT

7
3
17
23
2
5
11

68
55
58
52
57
62

32
43
37
45
42
36
34
27
27
29
36
41
33
27
29
26
37
46
33
29
27
19
42
42
40
38
35
37
40
38
38
33

70
2
7
2
4
4
7
14
15
2

Missouri
New Jersey
NewYork
NewYork
NewYork
North Carolina
North Carolina
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Texas
Virginia

64

10
6
10
11
I

12
11
I

2
6
9
18
30
3

68
66

61
58
58
71
69

70
63
52
60
56
61
74
57
57
59
52
62
62
59
51
50
64

WHITE

REPRESENTATIVE

Earl F. Hilliard (D)
Corrine Brown (D)
Carrie Meek (D)
Alcee L. Hastings (D)
Sanford Bishop.Jr. (D)
John Lewis (D)
Cynthia McKinney (D)
Bobby L. Rush (D)
Jesse Jackson.Jr. (D)a
Cardiss Collins (D)
William J.Jefferson (D)
Cleo Fields (D)
Albert R. Wynn (D)
Kweisi Mfume (D)b
John Conyers.Jr. (D)
B. Rose Collins (D)
Bennie Thompson (D)
William L. Clay (D)
Donald M. Payne (D)
Floyd H. Flake (D)
Edolphus Towns (D)
Major R. Owens (D)
Eva M. Clayton (D)
Melvin Watt (D)
Louis Stokes (D)
Thomas Foglietta (D)c
Chaka Fattah (D)
James E. Clyburn (D)
Harold E. Ford (D)
Sheila Jackson-Lee (D)
Eddie B.Johnson (D)
Robert C. Scott (D)

a .Served the remaining term of Representative Mel Reynolds who resigned in 1995.
b Retired from the House of Representatives in February 1996.
c Foglietta is white.
Source: Phillip D. Duncan, Christine C. Lawrence, and staff of Congressional Quarterly, Politics in America
I 996: The I04th Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1996).
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